

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1358

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: ASSURANCES ON EUROPEAN FORCE REDUCTIONS

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: STATE 46589 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: ASIDE FROM THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR ELEMENTS, THE MAJOR MBFR ISSUE NOW CONFRONTING THE ALLIES IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY CAN GIVE ASSURANCES TO THE EAST THAT NON-US NATO FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA WILL EVENTUALLY BE INCLUDED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL NOT BE INCREASED TO SUBSTITUTED FOR WITHDRAWN US FORCES. THE DISCUSSIONS AMONG ALLIES ON "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME," "LINK BETWEEN PHASES," "FREEZE," ETC., ALL
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TURN ON THIS FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF ASSURANCES ON EUROPEAN FORCES. MISSION FULLY AGREES THAT US SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN LOW-KEY APPROACH IN NATO ON THIS ISSUE. SOME ALLIES, HOWEVER, ARE ALREADY BEGINNING CONSULTATIONS IN SPC ON THIS SUBJECT AND WE MAY NEED

WASHINGTON GUIDANCE IN NEAR FUTURE ON THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE ASSURANCES WHICH WE COULD BE IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS WITH THE ALLIES.

ALTHOUGH ALLIES IN NATO COULD CONCENTRATE EFFORTS ON REACHING CONSENSUS ON A SINGLE ASSURANCE (E.G., GROUND FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT), MISSION FAVORS GIVING ALLIED NEGOTIATORS A SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE ASSURANCES -- RANGING FROM MINIMAL TO MAXIMAL -- WHICH THEY COULD USE WITH THE EAST, IN RETURN FOR FIRM EASTERN COMMITMENT TO TWO-PHASE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS AND TO THE COMMON-CEILING ABJECTIVE. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES MISSION'S VIEWS ON HOW CONTINGENCY GUIDANCE FROM NAC TO THE AD HOC GROUP ON THIS SUBJECT MIGHT BE FRAMED AND GIVES AN ILLUSTRATIVE SPECTRUM OF ASSURANCES ON EUROPEAN FORCES REDUCTIONS. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON MISSION'S PROPOSED APPROACH. WHILE MISSION WILL NOT TAKE THE LEAD IN DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN NATO, GUIDANCE ON OUTCOMES PREFERRED BY US WILL HELP US SET ACCEPTABLE PARAMETERS FOR ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. IN OUR COMMENTS ON NATO'S FUTURE WORK PROGRAM ON MBFR, MISSION DID NOT RPT NOT SUGGEST THAT US ASSUME HIGH PROFILE IN NATO ON THE QUESTION OF "LINK BETWEEN PHASES."

WE CONTINUE TO SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT WASHINGTON GIVE CLOSE ATTENTION TO TIMING AND EARLY CONSIDERATION TO THE KINDS OF ASSURANCES WHICH THE US COULD AGREE TO GIVE TO THE EAST ON OTHER ALLIED FORCES.

2. THIS ISSUE IS ASSUMING GROWING IMPORTANCE, NOT JUST IN LIGHT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES (VIENNA 2003), BUT ALSO IN VIEW OF INCREASING SENSITIVITIES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER PROSPECTS FOR EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND DFENSE INTEGRATION. OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT AS NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA PROCEED, EC COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN NGA WILL CONTINUE TO BECOME MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF MBFR ON THEIR FUTURE. UK REPS CAUTIONARY NOTE ON THIS POINT IN MARCH 5 AD HOC GROUP MEETING (VIENNA 2034) WAS A RECENT EXAMPLE --ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT VIEWS
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OF NEW LABOR GOVT WILL BE -- AND WE CAN EXPECT FRANCE WILL HAVE A CERTAIN IMPACT ON THINKING OF FRG AND OTHERS AS NEW EC-9 SUB-COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES GET UNDERWAY. MISSION ANTICIPATES, THEREFORE, THAT THE QUESTION OF ASSURANCES ON INCLUSION OF EUROPEAN FORCES WILL REQUIRE INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS HERE AT NATO AMONG ALLIES TO DEVELOP CONSENSUS IN TIME TO MEET NEEDS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA.

3. ONE APPROACH WOULD BE TO GUIDE ALLIES TO FOCUS ON A SINGLE ASSURANCE TO THE EAST, E.G., A GROUND FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT (GFLA). MISSION SEES DIFFICULTIES, HOWEVER, IN THIS SINGLE-TRACK APPROACH. FOCUSING ON A SINGLE SOLUTION MIGHT MAKE BUILDING

AN ALLIED CONSENSUS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT; FOR EXAMPLE, WITH RESPECT TO A GFLA, UK MIGHT CONSIDER IT TOO RESTRICTIVE, FRG MIGHT FIND IT TOO INFLEXIBLE, AND NETHERLANDS MIGHT SEE IT AS TOO MINIMAL. MORE IMPORTANTLY, A SINGLE SOLUTION WOULD HOBBLE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA IN THEIR EFFORTS TO STRIKE THE BEST BARGAIN WITH THE SOVIETS.

MOREOVER, THE SINGLE-TRACK APPROACH MIGHT REQUIRE CONTINUING REFERRAL OF ISSUE BACK TO NAC FOR CONSIDERATION OF OTHER APPROACHES, A PROSPECT WHICH USNATO WOULD DEPLORE.

4. IN MISSION'S VIEW, A BETTER APPROACH WOULD BE TO HAVE ALLIES IN NATO AGREE TO A SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE ASSURANCES WITH THE EAST, RANGING FROM THE LEAST TO THE MOST BINDING ASSURANCES WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE. THIS SPECTRUM APPROACH WOULD, WE BELIEVE, PROVIDE AN EASIER AND MORE EXPEDITIOUS VEHICLE FOR DEVELOPING ALLIED CONSENSUS, SINCE IT COULD MORE READILY ACCOMMODATE INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES OF OTHER ALLIES. IT WOULD ALSO GIVE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA SUFFICIENT LATITUDE TO TRY OUT VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES IN ORDER TO GET MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SOVIET COMMITMENT TO TWO-PHASE APPROACH AND TO COMMON-CEILING OBJECTIVE WITH MINIMUM POSSIBLE WESTERN COMMITMENT TO INCLUDE NON-US NATO FORCES. TACTICS WOULD BE UP TO AHG; SPECTRUM WOULD ENABLE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA TO BEGIN WITH LEAST FORTHCOMING ASSURANCE, MOVING, WHEN AND IF NECESSARY, TO THE NEXT. USNATO WOULD SEEK TO ENSURE THAT COUNCIL GUIDANCE WOULD LEAVE AD HOC GROUP FULL FLEXIBILITY ON MANNER IN WHICH TO EXPLORE VARIOUS FORMS OF ASSURANCES WITH THE EAST.

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5. MISSIONS SUGGESTED APPROACH, THEREFORE, WOULD BE TO ENVISAGE CONTINGENCY COUNCIL GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP WHICH ESSENTIALLY WOULD (A) DEFINE THE BASIC CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ALLIANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE ASSURANCES ON EUROPEAN FORCES; AND (B) LIST A RANGE OF ASSURANCES WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE. IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BASIC ALLIANCE POSITION, THIS GUIDANCE COULD COME UNDER RUBRIC C-M(73)83 OF "PROVISIONS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE."

6. ILLUSTRATIVELY, MISSION COULD ENVISAGE COUNCIL GUIDANCE ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

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AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
USCINCEUR
USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 1358

LIMDIS

A. STATEMENT OF BASIC CONDITIONS -- AD HOC GROUP WOULD
BE AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC ASSURANCES ON INCLUSION OF
OTHER NATO FORCES IN REDUCTIONS AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS GAVE
SIMILAR ASSURANCES THAT:

(1) THEY ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A TWO-PHASE APPROACH TO MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS;

(2) THEY AGREE TO THE COMMON-CEILING OBJECTIVE FOR THE NEGO-
TIATIONS; AND

(3) THEY AGREE THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE SECOND PHASE THE OVERALL
COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE RESPECTED BY EACH SIDE WITH NO SUB-CEILING
OTHER THAN ON THE US AND SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING.

B. SPECTRUM OF ASSURANCES -- IF NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE EASTERN
AGREEMENT TO THESE CONDITIONS, AHG COULD GIVE CERTAIN ASSURANCES
WITH RESPECT TO INCLUSION IN MBFR OF OTHER ALLIED FORCES IN THE NGA.
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AHG WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO EXPLORE ANY OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING
ASSURANCES WITH THE EAST, BEARING IN MIND THE DESIRABILITY OF PRO-
VIDING THE MINIMUM NECESSARY COMMITMENT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE
DESIRED ALLIED OBJECTIVES:

(1) PROVISION FOR CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS INTO A SECOND
PHASE -- THE ALLIES WILL BE WILLING TO INCORPORATE INTO A PHASE ONE
AGREEMENT SPECIFIC LANGUAGE PROVIDING FOR A SECOND PHASE OF
NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD ADDRESS THE AGGREGATES OF NATO
AND WARSAW PACT ROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE NGA AFTER FIRST
PHASE REDUCTIONS. (COMMENT: ALLIED NEGOTIATORS HAVE ALREADY
MADE CLEAR THEIR WILLINGNESS TO DO THIS, BUT COULD MAKE FURTHER
DETERMINED EFFORT TO GET SOVIET AGREEMENT, PERHAPS TABLING
ILLUSTRATIVE LANGUAGE. END COMMENT.)

(2) FIXED TIME BETWEEN PHASES -- THE ALLIES WILL AGREE TO INCLUDE IN THE FOREGOING PROVISION A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME (WHICH THE COUNCIL WOULD NEED TO SPECIFY) BETWEEN THE END OF PHASE ONE AND THE BEGINNING OF PHASE TWO.

(3) GROUND FORCE LIMITATION DECLARATION -- THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS (EXCLUDING US) MAKE A SEPARATE DECLARATION THAT FOR A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME (WHICH THE COUNCIL WOULD NEED TO DETERMINE) THEY WILL NOT RAISE THE TOTAL AGGREGATE MANPOWER OF THEIR GROUND FORCES PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN THE NGA. THEY WOULD EXPECT WP DIRECT PARTICIPANTS (EXCLUDING USSR) TO MAKE A SIMULTANEOUS DECLARATION. THE TERMS OF THIS DECLARATION COULD BE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS DECLARATION WOULD MOST LOGICALLY BE MADE AT TIME OF FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. IF REQUIRED BY NEGOTIATING SITUATION, HOWEVER, IT COULD BE MADE IN ADVANCE, IN WHICH CASE IT MIGHT APPLY AS WELL TO US AND SOVIET FORCES.

(4) GROUND FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT -- THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING TO AGREE TO A GFLA ALONG THE LINES OF THE FOREGOING DECLARATION, BUT AS AN INTEGRAL PROVISION OF THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT ITSELF, THUS MAKING IT A BINDING OBLIGATION.

7. MISSION HAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE FOREGOING LIST ANOTHER POSSIBILITY: INCLUSION OF TOKEN REDUCTIONS BY OTHER NATO FORCES IN THE NGA AS PART OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, WHICH EAST IS
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STILL PRESSING ON ALLIES (VIENNA 2061). IN MISSION VIEW, HOWEVER, US SHOULD NOT SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THIS OPTION. FIRST PHASE CUTS IN EUROPEAN FORCES, EVEN OF A SYMBOLIC KIND, WOULD RAISE A HOST OF QUESTIONS, E.G., REPARTITION OF CUTS AMONG EUROPEAN ALLIES, VERIFICATION, LIMITATIONS ON EUROPEAN EXERCISE, CONCERNS ABOUT EUROPEAN MOVEMENTS IN AND OUT OF AREA AND ACROSS FRONTIERS, ETC., WHICH WE ASSUME US WOULD WISH TO AVOID. MOREOVER, THE REVERSAL OF US POSITION INDICATED BY OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SUCH AN OPTION COULD LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT DELAYS IN ACHIEVING ALLIANCE CONSENSUS, COULD INCREASE SUSPICIONS THAT US WAS PLACING HIGHER VALUE ON SOVIET FEELINGS THAN ON ALLIED CONCERNS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND COULD SUBSTANTIATE IN SOME EUROPEAN CAPITALS OFT-REPEATED FRENCH WARNINGS TO EC-9 PARTNERS OF DANGERS OF MBFR.
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